

officials make attempts to create the image of patrons for average Ukrainians and keep economic resources, which generate corruption revenues, under control. It's rather illustrative that all the elections in Ukraine are held under left oriented slogans, while positions in public enterprises and the most «corrupted» ministers are strictly battled between winning fractions. The latest coalition negotiations demonstrate all the above-stated. Parties, which have so-called «golden share», try to convert their position not to the most important positions (for instance, the minister of economy, the vice-minister of European integration), but to the less public ones, invisible, but so delicious — positions of the minister of ecology or infrastructure.

And thirdly, the first two factors determine the absence of political will to do reforms. Political and economic elites (if this work can be used to characterize Ukrainian governmental officials) are interested to maintain the status quo. They feel their disability to compete under conditions of democracy and free market competition, being afraid to lose power and own business, which can function only in terms of «warm bath» — exclusive tax advantages, support from state budget funds, participation in uncompetitive public procurements (prospects for the ProZorro system and the similar ones are too undetermined), agreements to sell positions in election lists, ignoring public investigations and any enforcement activities, which injure the interests of influential political players.

Only solution of the above-mentioned problems can create a platform for efficient economic reforms. The author doubts that it's possible now, but stays confident that there is no other way.

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RENT-SEEKING AS AN OBSTACLE TO DEVELOPMENT OF THE LEGAL ECONOMY IN UKRAINE

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During the past quarter century, a system of informal interaction between the business and the power has been gradually forming in our country. Obviously, it is considerably complicated to overcome this system. Nevertheless, the society should meet the challenge, because the future of Ukraine depends on a degree of effectiveness of fighting against corruption.

Although rent-seeking in Ukraine is also formed in the area of everyday corruption, corruption in the area of informal interaction between the business and the power is the main system-creating influence. Existence of a powerful stratum of corruptive politicians and governmental officials and the impact of entrepreneurs, who benefit from informal interaction with the power, becomes an obstacle to development of the legal economy in Ukraine. These powerful forces are interested in maintenance status quo, which guarantees gaining high profits. Last two years, these forces actively restrain and hinder anti-corruption reforms.

The citizens frequently pay bribes in order to incent the officials to execute their professional functions rather than to gain benefits, which are not determined by the normative and legal basis. Therefore, the citizens mainly support fighting against corruption. The entrepreneurs are also obliged to operate in the current system of competitive advantages. If the government eliminates corruptive relations from this system, the entrepreneurs will compete within the limits of legislation, applying market methods of competition. Undoubtedly, some entrepreneurs will not be able to operate under new conditions. However, a majority of them will benefit from such an event. Thus, the business is interested in maintenance of corruption on level of particular persons, especially those prevailing in usage of governmental powers in own favor. In general, the class of entrepreneurs are enough tolerant to anti-corruption reforms. Simultaneously, rent-seeking is the main source of income for the corruptive politicians and the officials. They are interested in maintenance and expansion of corruption more than the others are. Moreover, maintenance of rent-seeking is a guarantee of absence of real punishment for corruptors.

Fighting against rent-seeking strikes a blow at the main source of corruption. Thus, it should become one of the most important elements of the anti-corruption reforms. There is a need to create economic and legal conditions, under which corruptive mechanisms of income formation will become unbeneficial and very risky.

Development of competition should become the general basis of the reforms. Under conditions of domination of market methods of competition, corruptors considerably lose their usefulness in entrepreneurs' opinion.

Carrying out comprehensive deregulation of the economy, the reformers should eliminate pre-conditions for claiming for bribes. The reformers must strictly and unambiguously regulate a minimal amount of government functions, which may be kept, with the use of legislative acts. The discretionary powers of politicians and officials must be maximally restricted and thoroughly controlled.

Economic industries, which conduce to rent-seeking, should be reduced. There is a need for legalization of the economy, blocking offshore schemes, and deliberated legalization of some types of the underground economy (namely, gambling). It is

necessary to get rid of a corruption source such as managing publicly owned companies. It is expedient to transfer the management of prospective companies to competent foreign companies. The rest companies should be transferred for long-term leases or conserved. The government should develop market relations in the field of land-use and usage of mineral resources. Government purchases should be reduced in accordance with restricted functions of the government.

It is impossible to liquidate some fields of the activity, where rent-seeking is formed. The management of the custom service and the fiscal service should be temporarily transferred to custom services and tax services of developed countries of the EU. Government purchases should be carried out on the basis of electronic trading with the use of maximally transparent schemes and under the control of the publicity. It is desirable to put government purchases into the hands of corresponding international organizations and reputed foreign firms.

The law enforcement agencies system requires reformation and radical staff renovation. Independent organizations should perform requalification of the former staff, accentuating features of the corruptive activity. Authorities of newly created anti-corruption agencies, particularly in the field of backroom investigative and search actions, should be extended. Analyzing problems and disadvantages of the court system operations, the author proposes to create an international anti-corruption tribunal for 5 years. It should consider cases of corruptors and judges.

In order to complicate rent-seeking, it is necessary to implement an effective system of total control of incomes, welfare, and expanses of governmental officials, politicians, and affiliated persons. On the other hand, there is a need for the significant increase of salaries for governmental officials and financing political parties from the state budget.

A reform of the political system, which aims at the increase of requirements to government reporting, is an important component of fighting against rent-seeking. Particularly, it is important to implement the practice of partial elections of representative bodies. There is a need for effective mechanisms of recalling deputies, president impeachment, and initiation of referendums on the part of citizens.

The reformers should destroy corruptive social networks, which have been forming during many years and decades. The reformers should renovate not only staffs of the law enforcement system and executive authorities bodies, but also all the governmental officials. At the primary stages, it is expedient to assign foreigners at managing positions. In addition, we need a system of social lifts: the educated and talented youth, which are not related to the old corruptive system, can take up a position at government agencies without oiling hand.

In the practice, the measures, which aimed at fighting against rent-seeking, are implemented by the politicians and the officials. At the same time, corruption is the

main source of the incomes for a significant part of the officials. Therefore, politicians and officials, which are not engaged in corruption, need support on the part of western partners of Ukraine and the civil society. It is not an easy task. Nevertheless, it should be noticed that only the radical decrease of rent-seeking will form pre-conditions for development of the legal economy in Ukraine.

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THE CRITERION OF ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY OF STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN CORPORATE INTEGRATION PROCESSES

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To suppose recommendations concerning conduction of structural analysis and structural changes in performing integration processes, there is a need to develop a practically applied and convenient criterion, which enables to carry out predictive and factual estimation of efficiency of structural transformations and to compare different forms of economic integration in order to choice an optimal direction of development at the first stage of research. Taking into account a close relationship between strategic and structural solutions for determination of such an economic criterion, it is important to more thoroughly consider principles of determination of efficiency of the changes applied in strategic planning.

A system of goals and restrictions in strategic planning is the criterial basis for comparison, acceptance, or cancellation of some or other forms of the strategies. The system of goals and restrictions is also the main criterion of estimation of the strategy efficiency in general and its mechanisms in particular. The author suggests considering the integral index of the value of a joint-stock company (JSC) or a corporate union as the main criterion indicating the economic interest of key groups of interests of participants of a corporate integration process. The integral index is determined by monetary flows, which arise or can potentially arise from: a potential opportunity of selling own business or a part of a business, e.g. by transferring corporate rights; direct usage of a business as a mechanism forming a flow of expenses, a part of which (for instance, in the form of dividends) is directed towards the payment of shareholder revenues; indirect usage of a business in order to earn incomes from off-site sources or in the form of complex solution combining